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Abstract: To model is to represent. The threshold of decidability defines two epistemological 
choices: one model (or a finite number of models) suffices for representing the dynamics below 
the undecidable; above this threshold (defined as G-complexity), every model is partial, no 
complete modeling is possible. 
 
Questions asked, questions not answered, answers raising new questions 
 
The only reason for engaging in the Open Peer Commentary of the text by Hannes Hornischer 
et al. is the multitude of questions it invites. These go beyond Heinz von Foerster’s Ethical 
Imperative and its computational interpretation instantiated as a Future State Maximization 
machine. All compliments (even the best-intended) are poisonous. The multitude of questions 
(the compliment) comes loaded: Why were they not answered? And if answered, how many 
answers raise more questions? This might qualify as a new imperative: always increase the 
number of questions to the benefit of more interaction. 
 
In the absence of a convincing case for distinguishing between simulation and model, the 
Introduction argues that although “there seems to be an even more fundamental and generic 
principle under which model use can be subsumed” (§1),  the way to go remains through 
models. The more “fundamental principle” turns out to be another model. If for no other 
reason because (so the argument) “space and time are constructions emerging from the use of 
models.” For those conversant in the subject of space and time, especially from a constructivist 
perspective, the statement begs for arguments beyond examples (as the authors provide). 
 
Long before the authors chose bacteria behavior, Lynn Margulis (1995), and later John Sowa 
(2016) and Mihai Nadin (2018) dealt with exactly the same. Goal-directed actions identify 
intentionality. But there is more to this subject, and one can only commend the authors for 
providing the opportunity to make the point. Change in respect to entities defined as living is 
expressed through their dynamics in the dynamic environment. The Petri dish is a reduction for 
making a point, but space and time do not emerge in the Petri dish, and not even in the larger 
framework (§3) in which a “gradient of higher concentrations” is hypothesized. Actually, to be 
alive is to be active. Goethe, who was also a scientist, ascertained that we know ourselves 
through action, a thought that Nikolai A. Bernstein, the visionary researcher of motoric 
expression and implicitly of anticipatory expression (1947) expressed as (I am paraphrasing), 
We know the world through our actions. Take note of the fact that this is no longer Pavlov’s 
understanding of reflex, i.e., reaction to the world, but “activity means purposeful action” 
(1936). 
 
In the discussion (“short detour”), modeling gets stuck in circular thinking: How should the 
virtual reconstruction of what is at stake in the given situation—bacteria able to somehow 
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procure nutrient—take place? According to von Foerster, in the absence of experience, the 
famous corollary “the environment contains no information; it is as it is” (1974)—the basic 
constructionist epistemology—stands. Before the constructivist, and in sharp contradistinction 
to Pavlov, Bernstein took note that to move in the world is to know it, not virtually, but 
existentially. The slime mold (Ball 2008) and also plants and everything else that is alive behave 
in a manner informed by experience. The specific movements of archaea, fungi, protists, 
bacteria, plants, and animals are the expression of reactiveness—what further down the line 
will be described as the outcome of hindsight—AND activeness—i.e., foresight. The former is by 
its nature deterministic, the latter, non-deterministic (Nadin 2020)1. Of course, this distinction 
invites some details. Foresight (Προμηθεύς) and hindsight (Ἐπιμηθεύς) are concepts reflecting 
the pragmatic framework of the context in which they are defined. It is more a matter of shared 
understanding.  
 
Since we are what we do (Nadin 1997), we constantly construct and reconstruct ourselves and 
implicitly our concepts. In the contemporary context of justified interest in computational 
representations, the two concepts are by necessity reinterpreted in terms pertinent to what 
computation is. In von Foerster’s words: “Experience is the cause, the world is the 
consequence.” In 1995, the American Society of Cybernetics made public an Anthology of 
Principles…2 on the subject of circularity containing the above sentence.   
Deriving his ethical Imperative3 under Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative example, von 
Foerster constructed, implicitly, the notions of action, possibility, and choice. Other tried a 
different path. To paraphrase Ernst von Glasersfeld (1984): We face reality as a burglar in the 
castle. In order to get to the booty, the burglar has to unlock it. The bacterium in the article—as 
well as all of us in the time of SARS-CoV-2—are in the same position. There is no multiplication 
of choices, rather an obsession with finding the key. In our days, code is the concept used. 
 
It is highly commendable that Hornischer et al. are looking for a principle different from that of 
traditional AI and machine learning. The originators of this path—Henry J. Charlesworth and 
Matthew S. Turner (2019) examine the emergence of social cooperation in animals. Working in 
groups give members advantages. The model of the swarm (or the flock, as with birds) proved 
to be effective for particular applications (many of them military in nature). In short, simulated 
birds navigate a virtual world (images). Maximizing the space of options results in cooperative 
behavior—it is not pre-programmed. This particular technique goes back to the time when 
Artificial Life (ALife) was fashionable (and generously funded). Upon a closer look, Future State 
 
1 Nadin M. (2020a) Reactia la crize: Prometeu si Epimeteu. Un epilog.  https://www.revistasinteza.ro/mihai-nadin-
reactia-la-crize-prometeu-si-epimeteu-un-epilog. Sinteza: a journal for culture and strategic thinking. July 18. Cluj, 
Romania. (The English text is available at https://philarchive.org/rec/NADPAE?all_versions=1 
2 Foerster H. von (1995) Anthology of principles propositions theorems roadsigns definitions postulates aphorisms 
etc. H.V.F. Cybernetics and Circularity. May 17-21. http://www.cybsoc.org/heinz.htm 
 
3 Foerster H. von (1995) Anthology of principles propositions theorems roadsigns definitions postulates aphorisms 




Maximization (FSM; but since the authors opted for FSX, their option is adopted volens-nolens 
in this commentary) recognized a valid question: Birds or not, is this an organizational principle 
characteristic of what is usually (i.e., at a primitive level ) described as intelligence? They 
believe it is. How intelligence is defined remains an open question. Hornischer et al. called up a 
Workshop (December 2019, Graz, at their University). One of the contributions (Margarete 
Boos and Hannes Hornischer 20194) was on maximizing options—an underlying principle of 
collective behavior in human groups. But neither in the article subject to this Commentary, nor 
in the mentioned workshop presentation is the above question answered. 
 
If computation,  then what kind of computation? 
 
In fact, the birds in the computational experiment are as much birds as virtual space is space. 
What is maximized is a computer-generated space representation—pixels, or vectors, or 
whatever it takes to translate space geometry into virtual geometry. Once again, those who 
took time to understand FSX had no difficulty in realizing that the algorithm (tree searches, 
nothing else) is similar to the algorithm behind any known game machine (chess, Go, but also 
machines playing computer and video games). Consider possible game options and select (using 
some weighting procedure) those “moves” that promise the highest return. The principle, 
which remains indeed in the modeling technique repertory, is applied in applications such as 
robotics or even digitally assisted farming, also known under the misleading title Precision 
Agriculture. Based on weather predictions (too dry, to wet, etc.),  insurance companies advise a 
farmer whether to raise a crop or cash in for not cultivating the land for a season. Cooperative 
behavior of agents used in such applications is algorithmic. Keeping options open maximizes the 
level of cooperation. If you use Excel or program in Python you know that the 
max() function returns the item with the highest value, or the item with the highest value in an 
iterable. That’s all there is. No intelligence, since there is no understanding of the meaning. 
 
In view of the above, the discussion of the Ethical Imperative appears as an attempt to align it 
with FSX (§7,58). The Maturana and Varela (1987) metaphor, which the authors mention in 
order to suggest the relation between maximizing future options and operational closure, 
disclose the reactive choice: sensors provide the submarine pilot with enough information for 
successful navigation in a dangerous deep-sea landscape. It is a deterministic machine, without 
any pro-active capabilities. In other words: no foresight at work. 
 
This puts their own rhetorical question—“Foresight rather than Hindsight?”—in a context 
beyond the rhetoric. Indeed, when “computable” means only algorithmic computation—in the 
sense of a Turing machine—and when information is actually only data—as in Shannon’s 
model, which is strictly syntactic (no semantic dimension, as Shannon himself made clear)—
what results is a deterministic machine. Regardless of the way it is implemented, it can only 
represent deterministic processes. The examples (agent positioned on a 2-dimensional finite 
grid, §19-24), emergence of leadership in groups (Example 1), aquatic robotic swarm, (Example 
 
4 Maximizing options-an underlying principle to collective behavior in human groups,  
https://colibri.uni-graz.at/de/neuigkeiten/detail/article/workshop-future-state-maximization/ 
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2 ) deserve respect for generating machines that operate according to the FSX. More 
problematic is the “Learning to behave” (§44). The authors claim that “the agent’s model 
emerges as information about probability of being in a certain state after taking a particular 
action in an initial state.” The pseudo-code does not justify the sentence “the model emerges 
as an eigenvalue.” The number of states sampled (random choices) and the learned model are 
in a predefined relation; therefore “eigenvalue” (described as “iterated attempts of an agent to 
come to terms with its options”) as a kind of attractor is simply not an option. Demon dialers 
assisted by neural networks do better, without any claim to learning. 
 
Be this as it may, the process described and the description are congruent. This quality cannot 
be noticed when the notion of anticipation is brought up (§53). To “anticipate the most 
sustainable states, i.e., the one that provides highest resilience, under conditions of non-
linearity and sudden, unpredictable transitions” (examples would be climate change) would 
imply a daemon, or at least a different kind of computation (non-algorithmic).  
 
The Ursache liegt in der Zukunft 
 
Discussing questions that the paper inspires is, of course, different from observing that 
prediction—i.e., to ascertain something about the future—is quite different from anticipatory 
action—i.e., to be active in the process of change. Prediction reflects the degree to which a 
deterministic process is captured in an actionable mathematical description. Anticipatory 
action, based on learning (experience remains the backbone of a constructive view of the 
world) is non-deterministic. The bacterium described in the paper actively discovers the world; 
a food could sustain life, or, if it is, by accident or by design (through a different subject) 
poisonous (bait), it can end life, or handicap it. In none of the examples given in the article can 
anticipation action emerge, because none of the computational processes involved has agency. 
There is a past from which data (not information) are derived, and there is a syntactic pattern. 
Anticipation ensues on account of learning, it undergirds evolution, and is manifested as 
consequential foresight. Ethics in von Foerster’s view, is anticipatory. Pursuant to a long 
conversation with him (Pescadero, CA, May 1999) on a formulation that invited unpacking its 
meaning—“Die Ursache liegt in der Zukunft”5— I adopted the title (with his blessing) for my 
book (Nadin 2003) Anticipation—The End is Where We Start From (actually quoting T.S. Eliot). 
But this goes, at least in this succinct formulation, beyond the limits of a commentary. 
 
More relevant is the understanding of the nature of von Foerster’s Ethical Imperative. Gödel’s 
undecidability offers a suggestive clue. It turns out that the living is G-complex (Nadin 2014), 
i.e., does not allow for decidable representations (i.e., descriptions or models). If indeed the 
increase in the number of choices should inform human action, the space of choices and the 
time during which they are made are open-ended. In short, we can never describe them all 
(they continue to multiply), and they will not be consistent. Algorithmic computation is 
decidable by definition. The article succinctly names its results: FSX corresponds to the Ethical 
 
5 Wir sehen nicht, daß wir nicht sehen Interview with Bernhard Porksen, April 15, 1998 
https://www.heise.de/tp/features/Wir-sehen-nicht-dass-wir-nicht-sehen-3446178.html 
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To express gratitude to the authors for offering a lot of material to think about and debate is 
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